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Aligning Pricing to Quality in Sports and Entertainment Businesses 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It is striking that in many sports and entertainment industries ticket prices are not varied on the 
basis of predictable game or performance quality. While this stylized fact is most often 
examined in the context of movie cinema pricing, we exploit data from a change in the pricing 
strategy of a major league baseball team to examine what happens when prices attempt to 
differentiate games on the basis of quality. We find that the data contains features that are 
inconsistent with the standard economic theory of price discrimination. Instead, we argue that 
the data is more easily reconciled with frameworks that incorporate either the notion that prices 
have a role in signaling quality or the notion that the framing of pricing categories affects 
consumer choices. This suggests that the analysis of pricing strategies in sports and 
entertainment industries requires more nuanced evaluation than ‘naïve’ pricing models would 
provide.   
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1. Introduction  
Australians love their sport. In 2005-2006, 7.1 million Australians aged 15 or over attended at least one 
professional sporting event as a spectator (ABS 2007). This corresponds to 44% of the population. The most 
popular sporting events (in order) were Australian Rules Football, Horse Racing, Rugby League and Motor 
Sports. Despite the clear enthusiasm of the consumer base in these markets, and the predictable variation in 
quality across individual games within each sport, it is striking that ticket prices do not vary with game quality. 
The same pricing strategy is apparent in many industries. Orbach and Einav (2007) document the same 
phenomenon in the pricing of cinema tickets noting that  
“In many instances, there are solid economic explanations for uniform pricing (McMillan, 2005). Typically, 
transaction costs, such as information and menu costs, and direct regulatory constraints on pricing account for a 
significant portion of the phenomenon. These explanations and others do not apply to the movie-theater industry.” 
In the same way that transaction costs fail to account for constant ticket prices across movies of different 
qualities, they also fail to account for a rationale for the widespread adoption of this pricing strategy in other 
entertainment industries, such as sports. 
This paper seeks to shed light on the management problem of working out what might happen if a sporting (or 
other entertainment/performance based business) were to charge differentially for similar events that had 
predictable quality differences known to both the firms and consumers. It does this by exploiting data from a 
Major League Baseball (MLB) Franchise in the USA that made precisely this strategy change: moving from 
inform pricing for all games to a four-tier pricing model that distinguished between games of different qualities. 
The team in question was the New York Mets, one of two MLB franchises operating in the greater New York 
area, primarily drawing support from the population of the borough of Queens on Long Island. 
In 2003 the Mets changed their pricing pattern for tickets to home games. Figure 1 shows the nominal pricing 
change for seats in the Mezzanine Box area, an intermediate quality seating area in the Mets’ home stadium.
1  
Before the 2003 season a seat in the Mezzanine Box area had the same price for all games in a season, regardless of 
the team being played by the Mets. For instance, in the 2001 and 2002 seasons the price of a ticket in this area 
was $33. Prices were only adjusted at the beginning of each season, resulting in a steady annual increase in the 
(nominal and real) price of tickets. Starting in the 2003 season the Mets began a scheme that set different prices 
according to the anticipated quality of the game. Each game was categorized as Gold, Silver, Bronze or Value, in 
decreasing order of quality. For mezzanine box seats, the price of a Gold game was highest, being $39 in the 2003 
and 2004 seasons, then Silver (at $36), Bronze ($33) and Value ($30). It is important to note the fact that the 
price of a Bronze game stayed the same through the regime chance, with the price of a value game going down 
and the price of Silver and Gold games going up. This pattern is the same for all seating categories offered by the 
Mets at their home stadium for which any change occurred.  
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Figure 1 
Games were classified on the basis of consensus among of the Mets marketing team.  The determination of game 
quality seems to have been a function of the time of year (an April game is more likely to be Value rather than 
Gold, while no Value games exist in July), the quality of the opposing team and idiosyncratic day specific 
considerations (for instance, the opening game of the season was always Gold). 
The data used to examine the effects of this strategy change is drawn from the Mets’ proprietary data archives. 
The bulk of this data is the record of prices and ticket sales for the Mets home stadium for every game from the 
1994 to 2004 seasons (inclusive). Additional data was available which contains information on concession 
revenues for games from the 1999 season onwards, and on method of ticket purchase (e.g. season tickets, tickets 
sold in packs and tickets sold on day of the game). Ticket sales are distinct from actual attendance since sale of a 
ticket does not mean the purchaser attended the game. This is relevant for the Mets, since concession sales form a 
significant revenue source for the team (in the 1999-2004 seasons, concessions sales, which includes 
merchandising, generated revenue of $167 million, compared to ticket revenues of $561 million).  
The simplest prediction of the effects of moving from a single price to the multiple price scheme adopted by the 
Mets is provided by the economic theory of price discrimination. The theory of 3
rd degree price discrimination 
(see Tirole (1988) for a standard treatment) is easily adapted to this setting. This theory predicts that the 
variation in attendance across games should decrease when higher quality games are assigned higher prices. In 
the data, the opposite occurs, suggesting that predictions based solely on the theory of price discrimination 
would be misleading. 
After documenting the inconsistencies between a simple model of price discrimination and the data, we argue 
that the patterns in the data are consistent with consumers drawing inferences of the games quality from the 
price assigned to it. That is, we argue that price may be serving a role as a signal of quality in this market. We also 
raise the possibility that framing effects (as discussed in the social psychology literature) may have some 
explanatory power.  
This leads us to argue that, for industries like sports and entertainment, where consumption occurs in a social 
context and the quality of the good is not perfectly apparent ex ante, pricing strategies may benefit from an 
analysis that keeps in mind the informational and contextual nature of pricing. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data; Section 3 describes the basic price 
discrimination model; Section 4 confronts this model with the data, illustrating some shortcomings; Section 5 
discusses robustness issues; Section 6 discusses the value of incorporating the notions of price as a signal of 
quality and framing effects into the analysis; and finally, Section 7 discusses the implications for the analysis of 
pricing strategies. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
1 The Mezzanine Box seats are located at the front of the second tier of seats in Mets home stadium.  
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2. Data 
The data set used in this study is constructed from the data archives generously provided by the Mets 
management team. Before discussing the construction of the data set and the summary statistics, we first 
describe aspects of the operation of the Mets baseball franchise. 
2.1 The operation of the Mets 
During each season the Mets play 81 home games during the regular season. A regular season lasts from April to 
September, with playoffs (finals) occurring in October. Home games occur at Shea Stadium located in the New 
York borough of Queens, a 45 minute subway ride from central Manhattan. Shea stadium seating can be divided 
into three tiers of elevated seating, with the first being at ground level, the second tier above the first and the 
third tier above the second. Between the elevated seating and the field are some high cost seating areas that put 
the spectators’ eyes at roughly the same level as the players’. Maximum stadium capacity is 55,437, making it 
roughly half the size of the Melbourne Cricket Ground. Within each tiered seating level, there exist several 
different seating areas differentiated on quality of view afforded from a typical seat. Table 1 shows the capacity of 
the main seating areas and the proportion of games for which ticket sales account for more than 95% of capacity 
for the combined 2001-2002 and combined 2003-2004 seasons. 
Table 1 Here 
2.2 Price Variation 
Table 2 lists all the seating areas in Shea stadium and compares prices before and after the move from a uniform 
pricing strategy to variable pricing. 
Table 2 Here 
The pattern of pricing for the Mazzanine Box, outlined in the previous section, is representative of all seating 
categories. 
2.3 Complications in constructing the data set 
The Mets’ proprietary data comprise two main sets of records. The first is the database on ticket sales by seating 
category and the second is the database on game characteristics (including opponent, game quality, temperature, 
outcome etc). Occasionally these two data sets do not match up due to games being rained out and replacement 
games being scheduled. This merely reflects the different purposes for which these data sets are used within the 
Mets organisation. Where the datasets do not match we drop the records, since this reflects a game date that had 
to be adjusted and thus makes the ticket sales data unreliable. We discard at most 8, at minimum 0 and on 
average 5 potential observations per season that were really rained-out games, and a slightly smaller number of  
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make-up games.
2 Dealing with this attrition in a more elegant way would involve making assumptions about the 
appropriate treatment of rained out games which were not rescheduled, and rescheduled games with potentially 
misleading ticket sales data. Instead we treat the process generating the mismatch in the data sets as random and 
exogenous, and omit the affected records in constructing the final data set. The final data set has 804 home games 
from the 1994-2004 seasons. At the time of the regime change there were 26 distinct seating categories. 
2.4 Methods of buying tickets 
There are many different ways to buy tickets for a Mets game. There four main ticket types: Season, Plan, Pack 
and Individual Game. Season Tickets give the right to attend all the games in a season and sit in the same seat for 
all games. Plans are like Season Tickets except that they are for a subset of a season. Examples of Plans include 
only weekdays, Tuesdays and Fridays only, Sundays only, and all games expect those on Saturday. Packs are 
bundles of tickets for between 6 and 8 games, directed at particular themes. For example, a Champion Pack will 
include games against the top performing teams from the previous season. Season Tickets are available for most 
seating areas, Plans are usually available for the Field Box, Loge Box and Mezzanine Reserved seating (with a 
little variation), and Packs are usually available only for Mezzanine Reserved and Upper Box seating. 
Tickets can be bought a variety of ways. Examples include via mail, phone, ticketmaster, and at games. The Mets 
keep track of 12 different channels for selling tickets. It is important to note that different service fees can be 
attached to different channels. We have only very limited data on these service fees and omit them from any 
formal analysis. There is no evidence that these fees changed when the price regime changed. 
Season, Plan and Pack Tickets are priced as the sum of their component parts. That is, any Season, Plan or Pack 
ticket can by synthesized by buying individual game tickets. The resulting price will be equal. There is no 
quantity discount for buying Season, Plan or Pack tickets. The only advantage to a Season, Plan or Pack ticket is 
that you have the same seat for all the games. 
 
3. A simple model of price discrimination 
The economic theory of price discrimination provides an initial (and standard) model through which to analyse 
the changing pricing strategy of the Mets (see Tirole 1988 for a technical treatment).  These models have been 
frequently applied to data in the empirical Industrial Organisation literature, Leslie (2004) and Verboven (2002) 
being recent examples. 
Diagram 1 summarises the analysis. The Mets classify games according to quality. Since higher quality should 
shift the demand for tickets to the game outwards, we can think of each category representing a different demand 
curve.  
Diagram 1 Here 
                                                           
2 This does not include the disruption and associated recording problems associated with the players’ strike in the later part  
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Before the pricing change, the ticket price was uniform, regardless of the demand curve. This price was the price 
of a bronze game (Pb). After the price changes, the price of a Gold game went up from Pb to Pg resulting in a 
predicted decrease in ticket sales from Z to Y. Similarly the price of a Silver game went from Pb to Ps. Conversely 
the price of a Value game went down from Pb to Pv resulting in a predicted increase tickets sales, from A to B.  
From the diagram it is easy to see that this simple model of price discrimination predicts that the difference 
between the minimum and maximum number of tickets sold should have decreased, assuming all other demand 
shifters do not adjust the relative positions of the demand curves across the period of the regime change (for 
instance, income levels do not change dramatically, or a substitute good does not enter the marketplace). It is 
trivial to show that this comparative static result is robust to different specifications of the demand curve, 
requiring only that demand be strictly downward sloping in the interval over which the price changes occur. 
 
4 Confronting the price discrimination model with the data 
The prediction of the simple price discrimination model is that the variation in the quantity of tickets sold across 
games should decrease. We use several measures of variation to test this prediction, including the difference 
between the minimum and maximum ticket sales and the variance of ticket sales.
3 We begin by imposing the 
least structure possible on the data, and then focus on specific summary measures of the changes in variation. 
Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of ticket sales in four of the seating categories. The Field Outer seating is located at 
ground level, along the foul line in the outfield, the Loge Box seating is at the front of the first tier of elevated 
seating, the Mezzanine Box is located at the front of the second tier, and the Upper Box is at the front of the third 
and highest tier.
4 
Figure 2 Here 
Three of these seating areas display data that is hard to reconcile with the simple model of price discrimination 
offered above. The problem is more starkly represented in the Field Outer seating area. Prior to the 2003 season 
pricing regime change the difference between the maximum tickets sales and the minimum had been steadily 
shrinking over time, until, in the 2002 season, this difference was 326 tickets. After the price chance this 
difference increases by almost a factor of four, to 1194. This sharply contradicts the predictions of the simple price 
discrimination model. Given the capacity in this seating category is about 3670 tickets, the magnitude of this 
change is also striking. 
Table 4 Here 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
of the 1994 season. Records associated with this period are also omitted, in those instance where we present 1994 data. 
3 Both these measures can be justified formally by adding more structure to the model. Since this formalism adds little insight we omit it. 
4 The mapping between seasons and game number is as follows: 2000 season comprises games 421 to 495, 2001: 496-576, 2002: 577-651, 
2003: 652-725, 2004: 726 onwards.  
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Several other seating areas show this pattern, although none are as stark as Field Outer. Table 3 summarizes all 
the seating areas offered by the Mets in the 2002 and 2003 seasons. The seating areas have been divided into three 
different sets. Set 1 are seating areas and tickets which are located very close to the diamond, comprising 
corporate boxes, special needs seating and press boxes. These are seats where any effect would be surprising 
since sell outs are ubiquitous for most of these areas. As predicted we see no large changes from 2002 to 2003. 
The exception is the Picnic Area seating which was expanded leading into the 2003 season and is, as the name 
suggests, a special case.
5 Set 3 is Loge and Mezzanine back row seating; this is typically only made available when 
a game is likely to be sold out. These are seating areas where management practices do not make testing of the 
price discrimination model appropriate. 
Set 2 contains the bulk of the seating made available by the Mets and is the focus of the testing of the price 
discrimination model. Five of these seating areas display the same pattern as discussed above for the Field Outer 
area. Field Outer, Loge Box Outer, Loge Reservation, Mezzanine Box and Mezzanine Reservation seating all see 
the difference between minimum and maximum ticket sales increase from the 2002 to 2003 season. Variance in 
ticket sales also increases for these areas, except Mezzanine Reservation seating.  
The column on the far right of Table 3 reports a formal test of the null hypothesis that the variance of seating is 
the same in the 2002 and 2003 seasons. This is conducted as a single-tailed test with the alternative hypothesis 
being that the variance in 2003 is greater than that in 2002. The test statistic reported is the ratio of the variance 
in 2003 to that in 2002. This test statistic has an F-distribution with 74 and 75 degrees of freedom. Rejection of 
the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
The null of equal variance in rejected in favor of the alternative of a variance increase from 2002 to 2003 in the 
Field Outer, Loge Box Outer, Loge Reservation and Mezzanine Box seating areas. In all these cases the 
probability of a type I error being associated with this conclusion is 5% or lower. 
Upper Box and Upper Reservation also seem to have the difference between minimum and maximum tickets 
sales increase, but the increase seems small and mainly reflects a downward shift in the mean ticket sales per 
game. Similarly, in Set 2 the only seating category where the null of equal variance can be rejected in favor of a 
variance reduction is in the Upper Box area. Along with the Upper Reservation area this is the worst seating in 
the stadium. 
Two categories see the difference between the minimum and maximum ticket sales decrease, Field Inner and 
Loge Box Inner, although the magnitude of decrease is only a small percentage of the mean ticket sales of the area 
(4% and 2% respectively, versus an average 16% for the 5 areas, above, where this difference increases). 
Figure 3 Here 
                                                           
5 There were actually 26 rather than 24 seating areas at the time of the regime change. In our primary data sources, two of the Wheelchair 
categories have been aggregated to Hcap-Field and the Metro Club figures include the Press Level Club. Some readjustment of seating 
capacities happened from the creation of the HP Club in the 2003 season. The ticket sales from this area are aggregated into HP Silver in 
our primary data.  
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Before investigating the robustness of this simple cut of the data, it is instructive to examine the structure of the 
variance in ticket sales before and after the price change. Again, we start by focusing on the Field Outer seating 
area. Figure 3 shows the empirical distribution function of ticket sales by season and, where appropriate, game 
type. Figure 3 shows that the distribution of ticket sales for Value games is stochastically dominated by Silver 
and Bronze games, which are in turn stochastically dominated by Gold Games. The distribution of all games in 
the 2001 and 2002 seasons stochastically dominates the distributions of Value, Bronze and Silver games in the 
2003 season. The performance of ticket sales for Value games in 2003 is stochastically dominated by the 
distribution of the bottom 25% of games in 2001-2002. This pattern also holds for Bronze and the 2
nd quartile of 
games in 2001-2002 and Silver and the 3
rd quartile. This is evidence that the change in the pattern of ticket sales 
at the time of the price change is due the price change, rather than being simply due to randomness introduced by 
some other confounding factor. 
Rather than present the same exercise for every seating area in set 2 of Table 3 (those that should be affected by 
the regime change), Table 4 summarises the data by reporting the number of times specific pairs of empirical 
distribution functions cross each other. In constructing this measure we exclude crossings occurring in the far 
tails, where the estimated empirical distribution functions are highly sensitive to extreme tail events in the data. 
As a result, we only count crossings lying between the 10
th and 90
th percentiles. 
Table 4 Here 
As can be seen, while the distinction between Silver and Bronze games can become a little blurred in some 
seating areas, there is a clear dominance pattern across most seating areas between Gold and Silver, and Bronze 
and Value.  
 
5. Robustness 
So far we have examined the data without taking into account contemporaneous effects that may be confounding 
the analysis. In other words, other events may have taken place at the same time as the change in price policy, 
leading us to incorrectly interpret the change in attendance patterns as resulting form the change in price policy.  
If the analysis above were done by comparing the means of samples, a simple regression framework would allow 
the impact of confounding factors to be accommodated. Since the analysis above is concerned with other features 
of the distribution of attendance (e.g., the variation of attendance), a regression framework is inappropriate. 
Further, even if a regression framework could be exploited, this would require making stronger parametric 
assumptions about the statistical properties of the data generating process which the descriptive, nonparametric, 
approach taken in the analysis is able to (largely) avoid. 
In this section, we consider potentially confounding factors in a largely descriptive manner consistent with the 
analysis so far. We consider four possible candidate factors: prices at different sections of Shea stadium and 
Yankees ticket prices (both of which are substitute products); the Mets performance (product quality); and  
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economics conditions in Queens (demand shifter).  We will argue that, while some contemporaneous effects did 
occur over the time of the Mets’ strategy shift, they do not appear to be able to fully explain the patterns already 
documented in the data.  In particular, while they may have changed the level of demand for Mets tickets, we find 
it unlikely that they would have changed the distribution in the manner documented in the previous sections. 
5.1 Changes in relative ticket prices within Shea Stadium 
Different seating areas in the Mets’ home stadium can be viewed as close substitutes for each other. As 
such, any price change may give rise to changes in the relative prices of different seating areas (or a 
change in prices relative to some outside alternative), which could change seating pattern via 
consumers’ substitution patterns across options.  
Recent advances in structural econometric methods have allowed the quantitative modeling of these 
substitution patterns in several applied settings (see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1996) for an 
introduction to methods). Leslie (2004) adapts these methods to study the pricing of Broadway theatre 
pricing, illustrating many of the virtues and limitations of this methodology when applied to data from 
entertainment venues. Most relevant to this exercise is the observation that these methods tend to take 
a strong stand on the underlying model generating the data and then quantify the implication of that 
model, rather than focusing on model testing per se. 
Table 5 documents the changes in relative prices of seating areas in Shea Stadium from 2002 to 2003. 
The price of the Field Outer seating is normalized to one in each column. As Table 5 shows, the changes 
in relative price that occurred due to the change in pricing strategy where very small. 
Table 5 Here 
5.2 Another close substitute: The NY Yankees 
There are at least two ways that the NY Yankees could affect the Mets. The first is by having a conflicting 
schedule. The second is by lowering prices or changing quality.  
Inspection of the teams scheduling make it clear that the Yankees and Mets schedules are coordinated to 
minimize overlap. 2001 and 2002 had five games overlap in the official schedule, 2003 had six overlapping games 
and 2004 had ten games overlap. This does not appear to be enough to explain the changes observed in the data. 
There is no evidence from win percentages or media sources that the relative quality of the Mets and Yankee 
changed significantly between the 2002 and 2003 seasons. Pricing data for the Yankees is limited. However, some 
information is available from a marketing company (Team Marketing (2005)) who survey the cost of attending a 
baseball game. They compute the cost of buying “average priced tickets” for a family of four and a bundle of 
concessions. According to their survey the cost of attending a Mets and Yankees game grew at the same rate from  
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2000 to 2003, taking 2000 prices as a base the price index for the Mets is 104.1 and 104.7 for the Yankees. In 2004 
the price of a Yankees game increased relative to the Mets, with the Yankees index rising to 111.1 in 2004 as 
compared to 105.2 for the Mets. Thus the relative price of the Yankees versus the Mets either stayed constant or 
increased over the 2001-2004 period. This offers little assistance in explaining our data. 
5.3 The Mets become a worse team 
Changes in the quality of the Mets may account for the changes in attendance. The win percentage of the Mets, 
from 2000 to 2004,  was 57.8, 50.9, 46.3, 41.4, and 43.5, respectively. This raises the concern that the observed 
change in attendance patterns is linked to the quality of the Mets changing at the time of the pricing strategy 
change. However, if this were true then the mechanism by which quality feeds into attendance would have to 
have a long and complicated lag structure. The biggest change in performance from one season to the next was 
from 2000 to 2001, which coincided with a rise in attendance and revenue. The same pattern was observed in 
2002. In 2004, attendance dropped even though team quality rose slightly. This suggests a complicated lag 
structure would be required to explain attendance changes with team quality changes.  
Even if these quality and attendance dynamic were driving attendance, the sudden shift in attendance patterns in 
2003 (see for instance figure 2) is more suggestive of a structural change occurring rather than the continuation 
of some pre-existing data generating process.  
5.4 Economic conditions in Queens 
If the NY borough of Queens, which is the traditional fan base of the Mets, were hit with a downturn in 
economic activity we would expect this to have a negative impact on the Mets, forcing people to substitute to 
other, cheaper, forms of entertainment. This would, at least, help explain the fall in average attendance for the 
Mets. 
According to US Bureau of Labor Studies data, the real average weekly wage fell by 4% between 2001 and 2004. 
Once employment data has been seasonally adjusted, there appears to be a slight, but steady, upward trend in 
employment over the same period after a loss of about 10,000 jobs in the later part of 2001. Employment levels at 
the end of 2004 were at the same level as the middle of 2001. Census data on housing permits, record that in 2001, 
4271 construction permits for privately owned residential building were issued with a total construction cost of 
$233 million. In 2002 there were 4674 permits ($275.5 mil.), 5624 permits in 2003 ($348.6 mil.) and 8839 permits 
in 2004 ($538.3 mil.).
6 
Thus, depending on your choice of indicator, economic conditions in Queens were either improving quickly or 
had got marginally worse over the period of interest. On balance, we find it difficult to build a compelling case 
that the economic conditions in Queens should have had a significant impact on the Mets over the 2001-2004 
period.  
                                                           
6 These data are all available online via the BLS and US Census websites: www.bls.gov and www.census.gov  
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6 Possible explanations that are consistent with the data 
The unsatisfactory performance of the standard price discrimination style model of consumers’ responses to the 
change in pricing strategy suggests that some other model of consumer choice needs to be incorporated into an 
analysis of the effects of moving from a uniform pricing scheme to the more complicated variable price scheme. In 
this section we offer two approaches to thinking about consumer choices that appear to have some hope of fitting 
the qualitative features of the data. The first is drawn from the economics literature and models consumers as 
drawing inferences about the quality of the good from its price – that is, price serves as signal of quality. The 
second approach draws on the ideas of social psychology to suggest that at least some of the patterns observed 
may be a consequence of the consumers’ responses to framing issues. 
6.1 A Model of Price as a Signal of Quality 
In this section we offer an adaptation of a model of quality signaling through price that replicates the patterns 
seen in the demand data. An extensive theoretical literature exists which explores the idea that consumers make 
inferences about product quality from price (e.g. Admanti and Pfleiderer (1986), Bagwell and Riordan (1991), 
Becker (1991), Hellwig (1980), Judd and Riordan (1994), Kyle (1989), Mathews and Postlewaite (1985), Milgrom 
and Roberts (1986), and in the context of theatre, Throsby (1990)).  
Here we adapt the Judd and Riordan (1994) (Hereafter, JR) model to our application. We skip technical details 
and proofs that are contained in JR, and discuss the model in the context of choosing to attend a baseball game. 
The idea of JR is that consumers have information about the utility they derive from a given baseball game, but 
not complete information. The Mets also have information that is different from that obtained by consumers. The 
consumers anticipate that the Mets will use this information to set prices (and game categories) and use the 
game category and price, together with their own information, to make inferences about expected game quality. 
More formally: say consumer is demand for a game is given by 
qig = E[yig|I] - p 
where the subscript g denotes a game and I is the consumer’s information set and  
yitg = xtg + ni + vitg 
where xtg is the component of value common to all consumers who see team t play in game g, ni is the individual’s 
preference for baseball, irrespective of the specific game or team, and vitg captures the individual taste for a 
specific game and team combination. Consumers only see their total utility from attending a game. To capture 
learning by consumers, we assume that they have been to a game (g=1) featuring team t at some previous point and 
make a decision conditional on the utility they received from that game. The variables x, n and v are all  
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independent standard normally distributed random variables with mean zero and variances σ
2
x , σ
2
n and σ
2
v. 
The unconditional expectation of xtg is x. 
The Mets receives a signal ztg which is correlated with xtg such that  
ztg = xtg +ψ tg 
where ψ tg is distributed normally with mean zero, variance σ
2
ψ and is independent of x, n, and v. 
Under these conditions it is easy to show that, if prices are uniform (and thus not informative), demand is given 
by 
qi2 = E[yi2| yi1] – p = [(σ
2
x+ σ
2
n)/ σ
2
y]yit1 + [1-(σ
2
x+ σ
2
n)/ σ
2
y]x – p       [1] 
When the games are divided into categories, consumers draw inferences about z such that ž= E[z| max z = z
[n(c):N], 
min z = z
[n(c+1):N]], where z
[n(c)] denotes the n(c)-th order statistic of z, from  a sample of N. The argument c refers to 
the category of the game with 1 = gold, 2 = silver and so on with z
[n(5):N] approaching -∞. Thus, when prices are 
differentiated, demand looks like 
qi2 = E[yi2| yi1 , p] – p = α yyi1 + α z ž+ α xx – p               [2] 
where α z , α x  and α z are ratios of sums of the variances and are defined in the appendix. Note that this 
formulation explicitly captures the fact that the game category is a sufficient statistic for the information in the 
price. 
Figure 6 shows the outcome of this model for a specific parameterization. We examine the consumer’s choice 
under two scenarios. The first is when the previous utility was high. The second is when the previous utility is 
low. In each scenario we consider what happens when the game is allocated to one of two categories: good or 
bad. We assume that there are 10 games in the season, the five with the lowest (highest) z signals get allocated to 
the bad (good) category and given a lower (higher) price. Lastly we let the variances of x, n, v and ψ  equal 1. 
Diagram 2 Here 
This parameterization demonstrates the possibility that the patterns in the data can be demonstrated by a model 
where consumers are extracting additional information about game quality from the allocation to categories (or, 
equivalently, prices). With uniform prices, demand for games where the previous utility was high (low), the 
quantity demanded is QUH (QUL). The difference between maximum and minimum quantity demanded is QUH - 
QUL. When the seller price discriminates between good and bad games, the maximum quantity demanded is 
QDHG and the minimum is QDLB. As long as the difference between the price of a good game (PG) and bad game  
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(PB) is sufficiently small, QDHG – QDLB >  QUH - QUL, which corresponds to the stylized fact from the data that 
needs to be explained. 
6.2 A Model of Price as a Coordination Device 
The utility from attending a sports event depends not only on the objective quality of the event but also on the 
number and type of attendees.  Imagine a game at the Mets’ Shea stadium with only one spectator in the stands.  
No matter how good the game itself is, the excitement from watching such game would likely be rather low. 
This simple fact leads to a variation on the previous theory of signaling.  One reason why an uninformed fan may 
want to know what games are of higher “quality” is that higher quality games are more likely to attract more fans 
and as thus be more fun to watch.  In that case, prices function not just as a signal of quality but also as a 
coordination device: they indicate to fans what games are more likely to attract large crowds.
7  In fact, even fans 
who do not care about the quality of the game (e.g., a tourist who does not much about baseball) will correctly 
anticipate a more exciting event when the price is higher. 
6.3 Framing Effects 
The impact of the framing of options has been noted within both the social psychology and behavioural 
economics literatures as having a measurable effect on consumer choice. Strands of both these literatures have 
examined framing effects on choices where the choice involves some aspect of social interaction and cooperation 
(see for instance Dawes(1980),  Rutte et al (1987), Fleishman (1988), Messick et al (1993), and Andreoni (1995)).   
Since sporting and entertainment events (like baseball) are typically consumed in a social context, it is 
conceivable that the framing of these events created by the pricing and marketing of them would have a bearing 
on the consumers’ willingness to attend.
8 This is illustrated most viscerally in the case of a father considering 
taking his son to the baseball: if the son can observe that the father has chosen a “value” game any symbolic worth 
enjoyed by the father may be diminished relative to attending a “gold” game. This deterrent effect for games 
labeled as ‘less than gold’ would not be present under the uniform pricing strategy. This sort of story suggests 
that the largest negative drops in attendance should be for value games vs those games, pre-pricing change, that 
lay in the bottom quartile of attendance. This is what is observed in the data for the Field Outer area.
9 
 
7. Implications for strategy analysis 
                                                           
7 There is an economics literature on the coordination role of advertising expenditures: see Bagwell and Ramey (1994a,b).  
We are not aware of a coordination story similar to ours. 
8 Caves (2000) discusses the social aspect of the consumption of entertainment goods at some length. 
9 Various contributions to the literature have presented evidence that suggest that perceptions of fairness may induce consumers to 
respond to pricing changes in ways that run contrary to the predictions of economic theory (see, for example, Kahneman et al (1986) and, 
in the context of entertainment industries, Okun (1981) at 170). A reasonable fairness-based story should predict that consumers will 
object most to price increases (perceive them as unfair) and least to price decreases (perceive them as more fair), which is contrary to the 
patterns observed in these data: Value games (for which prices decreased) experience the greatest decrease in attendance following the 
change in pricing strategy.  
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Per game ticket revenue for the Mets dropped from $1,100,769 in the 2002 season to $976,484 in the 
2003 season, an 11.3% drop. Attendance per game dropped from 36,012 to 28,581, a 20.6% per sent drop. 
Since a baseball franchise draws significant revenue from concession sales, a drop in attendance is 
doubly bad news. As might be expected, concession revenue per game dropped from $408,812 to 
$285,045 following the change in price strategy, a 30.3% drop. While the other factors discussed earlier 
may have been driving some of these figures, they are sufficiently large and sufficiently different from 
the trend in previous seasons to suggest the conjecture that the change in pricing strategy was not 
ultimately a success for the Mets. 
In contrast, the conventional workhorse of pricing strategy, price discrimination theory, would have 
suggested that the Mets should have been able to do at least as well by adopting variable pricing as by 
maintaining uniform pricing. This is easy to see since a uniform pricing scheme is merely an element in 
the set of feasible variable pricing schedules: given two sets, one being a subset of another, the maximal 
element of the larger set must be weakly greater than the maximal element of the smaller set.  
While it is possible that the strategy choice was marred by poor execution (choosing the wrong prices), 
the patterns in the data suggest that at least some of the poor performance after the change was likely 
due to effects unanticipated by the theory of price discrimination theory.  
The alternative theories offered here, price as a signal of quality, price as a coordination device, and 
framing effects, are best viewed as complementing the price discrimination framework. That is, in 
industries like sport and entertainment, where the good consumed has some element of uncertainty as 
to its ultimate quality and where consumption has a social aspect, considering the information value of 
pricing schemes and the implications of how they are presented to consumers may be useful for 
evaluating pricing strategies. Certainly in the case of the Mets strategy choices, the story told by the 
data are much more easily reconciled with a framework that considers these elements, rather than one 
that does not. 
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Appendix: Definitions 
The following definitions were omitted from section 6.1 in the discussion of equation [2]. These come straight 
from the normality and independence assumptions. 
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Figure 1: Nominal Prices of Mezzanine Box Seating: 1994 - 2004 Seasons
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Table 1: Seating Capacity and Utilisation
Seating Area Capacity % of games within 5% of capacity
2003-2004 2001-2002
Entire Stadium 55437 5.2% 5.8%
Upper Res 16356 7.2% 7.7%
Upper Box 4020 5.2% 14.1%
Mezz Res 8226 5.2% 19.9%
Mezz Box 3580 4.6% 16.0%
Loge Res 4961 5.2% 5.8%
Loge Box Outer 1198 10.5% 34.6%
Loge Box Inner 1068 3.9% 4.5%
Field Outer 3685 9.8% 64.7%
Field Middle 938 100.0% 100.0%
Field Inner 1848 15.0% 35.9%
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Table 2: Prices before and After Price Regime Changes
2003-2004 2001-2002
Seating Area Gold Silver  Bronze Value
HP Club Gold $215 $205 $195 $185 $195
HP Club Silver $161 $153 $145 $137 $145
Baseline Club $161 $153 $145 $137 $145
Metro Club Gold $76 $70 $64 $58 $64
Baseline Inner $76 $70 $64 $58 $64
Metro Club  $72 $66 $60 $54 $60
Press Level Club $72 $66 $60 $54 $60
DVS $72 $66 $60 $54 $60
Hcap - HP Club $72 $66 $60 $54 $60
Inner Field  $53 $48 $43 $38 $43
Inner Loge Box $53 $48 $43 $38 $43
Baseline Outer $53 $48 $43 $38 $43
Middle Field Box $46 $42 $38 $34 $38
Mezzanine Box $39 $36 $33 $30 $33
Outer Field  $39 $36 $33 $30 $33
Outer Loge Box $39 $36 $33 $30 $33
Press Box $36 $33 $30 $27 $30
Loge Reserved $33 $31 $29 $27 $29
Picnic Area $32 $30 $28 $26 $28
Hcap - Field $27 $25 $23 $19 $23
Mezzanine Reserved $27 $25 $23 $19 $23
Upper Box $27 $25 $23 $19 $23
Loge Reserved, Back Rows* $16 $14 $12 $8/$5 $12
Mezzanine Reserved, Back Rows*,** $16 $14 $12 $8/$5 $12/$11
Upper Reserved* $16 $14 $12 $8/$5 $9
Hcap - OF $14 $12 $10 $8/$5 $10
* The price of value games in 2003 was $8 and in 2004 was $5
** The price was $12 in 2002 and $11 in 2001  
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Figure 2: Scatter Plots of Selected Seating Categories
Notes: Y axis is recorded ticket sales, x axis is the game number, where game 1 is the first game of the 1994 
season. The 1995 season starts at game 52, 1996 at 122, 1997 at 197, 1998 at 272, 1999 at 345, 2000 at 422, 
2001 at 496, 2002 at 577, 2003 at 652, 2004 at 726. The discontinuity in the Field Outer graph at game 422 is 
due to the creation of the Field Middle seating area. Field Outer and Loge Outer seating was first offered in the 
1997 season.
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due to the creation of the Field Middle seating area. Field Outer and Loge Outer seating was first offered in the 
1997 season. 
 
23
 
Table 3: Mean, Minimum, Maximum and Standard Deviation Attendance by Seating Category
2002 2003 Standard Deviation Test Statistic
Mean Min Max Max-Min Mean Min Max Max-Min 2002 2003 H0: σ
2
2003=σ
2
2002
Baseline Club 48 48 48 0 48 48 48 0 0.0 0.0 H1: σ
2
2003>σ
2
2002
Baseline Inner 96 96 96 0 96 96 96 0 0.0 0.0 na
Baseline Outer 128 128 128 0 128 128 128 0 0.0 0.0 na
DVS 536 450 734 284 445 348 646 298 59.8 57.6 0.930
Set 1 Hcap - Field 41 6 61 55 33 6 60 54 17.6 15.5 0.777
Hcap - OF 24 0 80 80 19 0 80 80 26.8 24.5 0.835
HP Gold 65 60 73 13 59 49 60 11 5.0 2.0 0.156
HP Silver 137 132 143 11 206 204 209 5 3.6 1.8 0.245
Metro Club 2265 2235 2369 134 2259 2245 2354 109 24.8 19.1 0.594
Metro Club Gold 1241 1240 1255 15 1145 1144 1162 18 2.5 3.0 1.514**
Picnic Area 444 0 832 832 480 0 1400 1400 346.8 432.1 1.552**
Press Box 182 100 244 144 154 78 288 210 61.8 67.1 1.180
Field Inner 1736 1508 1848 340 1700 1532 1809 277 55.2 57.9 1.101
Field Middle 934 934 934 0 935 932 938 6 0.0 1.5 na
Field Outer 3568 3359 3685 326 3032 2462 3656 1194 69.0 314.7 20.833***
Loge Box Inner 972 928 1068 140 970 937 1062 125 24.4 21.8 0.798
Set 2 Loge Box Outer 1067 827 1192 365 855 667 1198 531 100.8 144.0 2.043***
Loge Res 3937 2132 4786 2654 3006 1583 4812 3229 639.6 936.4 2.144***
Mezz Box 2801 1664 3461 1797 1985 1201 3517 2316 529.2 663.2 1.570**
Mezz Res 5301 1038 8210 7172 3519 655 8224 7569 2011.8 1837.8 0.835
Upper Box 2162 43 4020 3977 1020 14 4020 4006 1307.7 925.6 0.501
Upper Res 7611 672 16296 15624 6227 394 16304 15910 4911.4 4812.9 0.960
Set 3 Loge BR 429 0 1472 1472 134 0 1472 1472 557.3 368.8 0.438
Mezz BR 287 0 2310 2310 125 0 2310 2310 629.0 525.9 0.699
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Figure 3: Empirical Distribution Functions of Attendance, Field Outer Seating 
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Table 4: Counts of crossings of empirical distribution functions of attendance
Gold & Silver Silver & Bronze Bronze & Value
Field Inner  502
Field Outer 000
Loge Box Inner 125
Loge Box Outer 040
Loge Res 050
Mezz Box 010
Mezz Res 000
Upper Box 201
Upper Res 21 1 0
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Table 5: Relative Prices before and After Price Regime Changes
2003 2002
Seating Area Gold Silver  Bronze Value
HP Club Gold 5.513 5.694 5.909 6.167 5.909
HP Club Silver 4.128 4.250 4.394 4.567 4.394
Baseline Club 4.128 4.250 4.394 4.567 4.394
Metro Club Gold 1.949 1.944 1.939 1.933 1.939
Baseline Inner 1.949 1.944 1.939 1.933 1.939
Metro Club  1.846 1.833 1.818 1.800 1.818
Press Level Club 1.846 1.833 1.818 1.800 1.818
DVS 1.846 1.833 1.818 1.800 1.818
Hcap - HP Club 1.846 1.833 1.818 1.800 1.818
Inner Field  1.359 1.333 1.303 1.267 1.303
Inner Loge Box 1.359 1.333 1.303 1.267 1.303
Baseline Outer 1.359 1.333 1.303 1.267 1.303
Middle Field Box 1.179 1.167 1.152 1.133 1.152
Mezzanine Box 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Outer Field  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Outer Loge Box 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Press Box 0.923 0.917 0.909 0.900 0.909
Loge Reserved 0.846 0.861 0.879 0.900 0.879
Picnic Area 0.821 0.833 0.848 0.867 0.848
Hcap - Field 0.692 0.694 0.697 0.633 0.697
Mezzanine Reserved 0.692 0.694 0.697 0.633 0.697
Upper Box 0.692 0.694 0.697 0.633 0.697
Loge Reserved, Back Rows 0.410 0.389 0.364 0.267 0.364
Mezzanine Reserved, Back Rows 0.410 0.389 0.364 0.267 0.364
Upper Reserved 0.410 0.389 0.364 0.267 0.273
Hcap - OF 0.359 0.333 0.303 0.267 0.303
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Diagram 2: Demand Conditions under Different Pricing Regimes 
with Signalling  
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Notes: The demand curves were generated from the adapted Judd and Riordan (1994) model, with the 
following parameters: all variances equal 1, previous utility equals either 1 (if low) or 2 (if High) and 
the unconditional expectation of x is equal to 1. Uniform Price refers to the regime where price does 
not  vary  by  game,  Discriminatory  Price  refers  to  the  regime  where price does vary by game. We 
assume 10 games in total, the expectation of z if category = bad (good) is - 1.24.
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6. Discriminatory Pricing, Previous Low, Category Bad
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following parameters: all variances equal 1, previous utility equals either 1 (if low) or 2 (if High) and 
the unconditional expectation of x is equal to 1. Uniform Price refers to the regime where price does 
not  vary  by  game,  Discriminatory  Price  refers  to  the  regime  where price does vary by game. We 
assume 10 games in total, the expectation of z if category = bad (good) is - 1.24.
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2. Discriminatory Pricing, Previous High, Good Category
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